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1. Introduction 
 
Does geographic diversification boost corporate valuation? Several theories suggest that 
geographic diversity will enhance efficiency, spread idiosyncratic risk, and reduce agency costs, 
with positive ramifications on corporate valuations. Specifically, geographic diversity could 
enhance market valuations through economies of scale (Chandler, 1977; Gertner, Scharfstein, 
and Stein, 1994; Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997; and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999) 
and by reducing exposure to idiosyncratic local shocks. And, for the case of banks, Diamond 
(1984) holds that it is easier for outside investors to monitor whether a bank is well-diversified 
than it is to assess the idiosyncratic investments of a specialized bank.  
On the other hand, theories of corporate governance by Jensen (1986), Jensen and 
Meckling (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) suggest that if 
small shareholders find it difficult to monitor and govern geographically dispersed 
corporations then corporate insiders will have greater latitude to extract private benefits from 
geographically diversified firms with adverse effects on firm valuations. Even if diversification 
intensifies agency problems and reduces market valuations, insiders might still diversify the 
corporation’s assets if the insider’s additional private benefits are greater than their own losses 
from the corporation’s lower value. 
Identifying the causal impact of diversity on the performance and valuation of firms has 
proven challenging.  For nonfinancial firms, a considerable body of research finds that firms 
that diversify across different activities tend to have lower valuations, e.g., Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997). For 
financial firms, Laeven and Levine (2007) find a diversification discount in an international 
cross-section of banks that diversify across different financial activities, and Acharya et al.   2 
(2006) find that activity diversification reduces bank performance and increases risk in a 
sample of Italian banks. But, many researchers question whether diversification causes these 
valuation effects, e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, 
Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), and Villalonga (2004). In particular, concerns remain about 
causality because it is difficult to identify exogenous sources of variation in diversification 
across firms.   
Research on the valuation effects of geographic diversification are subject to similar 
identification concerns. For nonfinancial firms, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) show that global 
diversification is associated with valuation discounts. For banks, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) 
find that diversification across U.S. states is associated with valuation premiums. But, it is 
difficult to draw causal inferences about the impact of diversification on corporate valuations 
from these studies.  
In this paper, we design and implement two new empirical strategies for identifying the 
causal impact of geographic diversification on firm valuation. Specifically, we use data on U.S. 
bank holding companies (BHCs) to study the impact of geographic diversification across the 
states of the United States on the market valuation of those BHCs.   
We study U.S. BHCs for three reasons. First, specific regulatory changes that we describe 
below and that applied only to banks provide a natural setting for identifying the causal impact 
of geographic diversity on BHC valuations and behavior. Second, we have detailed information 
on BHC subsidiaries and their geographic diversity. Third, banks provide vital services to all 
sectors of the economy (Levine, 2005), so the impact of diversity on BHC valuation and 
performance is of central importance. In this way, we contribute to the debate about the impact 
of the diversity on the valuation and performance of firms in general and BHCs in particular.   3 
At the core of both identification strategies, we exploit the cross-state, cross-time 
variation in the removal of interstate bank branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous 
increase in geographic diversity at the BHC level. From the 1970s through the 1990s, individual 
states of the United States removed restrictions on the entry of out-of-state banks.  Not only did 
states start deregulating in different years, states also signed bilateral and multilateral 
reciprocal interstate banking agreements in a somewhat chaotic manner over time. There is 
enormous cross-state variation in the twenty-year process of interstate bank deregulation, 
which culminated in the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1995.  
There are good economic and statistical reasons for treating this process of deregulation 
as exogenous to bank valuation.  Restrictions on interstate banking protected banks from 
competition for much of the 20th century. During the last quarter of the century, technological 
and financial innovations eroded the value of these restrictions. For example, Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) find that checkable money market mutual funds facilitated banking by mail and 
phone, and improvements in data processing, telecommunications, and credit scoring 
weakened the advantages of local banks. They hold that these innovations reduced the 
willingness of banks to fight for the maintenance of protective regulations, triggering 
deregulation. Furthermore, we find no statistical evidence that valuations or changes in 
valuations affected the timing of deregulation. And, there is no evidence that states signed 
bilateral and multilateral interstate banking arrangements based on BHC valuations. Thus, the 
process of interstate bank deregulation provides a natural laboratory for evaluating the impact 
of BHC diversification on valuations. 
The first identification strategy uses the state-time variation in the dynamic process of 
interstate bank deregulation as an instrument for the geographic diversity of BHCs. Past   4 
researchers have treated interstate bank deregulation as a single, discrete event, typically 
dating deregulation as the year in which a state first allows banks from any other state to enter. 
We believe that we are the first to exploit the state-specific dynamics of deregulation. In this 
first strategy, we only provide information on the dynamic impact of diversity of a state’s 
“average” BHC, because our instrument does not have a BHC-specific component. 
The second identification strategy imbeds the state-time variation in the dynamic 
process of interstate bank deregulation into a gravity model of individual BHC investments in 
“foreign” states to develop a BHC-specific instrumental variable of diversification. Inspired by 
Frankel and Romer’s (1999) study of international trade and growth, we construct a BHC-
specific instrument for geographic diversity in the following manner. First, for each BHC in each 
period, we use a gravity model to estimate the share of assets it will hold in each “foreign” state, 
conditional on there being no regulatory prohibitions on establishing a subsidiary in that state. 
Second, based on this estimate—and imposing a zero when and where there are regulatory 
prohibitions on interstate banking—we compute the projected geographic diversity of each 
BHC in each period. This gravity-deregulation model produces the instrumental variable that 
we employ to identify the causal impact of geographic diversity on Tobin’s q at the BHC-level. 
We believe that we are the first to exploit the gravity model to examine the “foreign” direct 
investment decisions of banks. More importantly, we use this framework to differentiate among 
banks within the same state while exploiting each state’s specific process of deregulation. 
Both identification strategies indicate that increases in geographic diversity reduce BHC 
valuations, which is consistent with the idea that diversification intensifies agency problems 
within BHCs.  This finding holds after controlling for BHC fixed effects, state-quarter fixed 
effects, and a wide-array of time-varying BCH characteristics, such as size, profitability, and   5 
market competition. The results reflect the impact of geographic diversification per se, not the 
effects of greater competition triggered by interstate deregulation. Even when conditioning on 
the degree to which the BHC engages in a diversity of activities, there is still a significant, 
negative impact of geographic diversity on q. Robustness tests further indicate that the results 
are not driven by changes in the accounting value of assets, or other oddities, around the time 
of mergers and acquisitions.  
This paper relates to several strands of research. For instance, while Goldberg (2009), 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) find that cross-economy 
banking boosts efficiency and growth while reducing economy volatility, Liberti and Mian 
(2009), Mian (2008), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Brickley et al. (2003) argue that the 
effectiveness of banking deteriorates with the distance between bank and borrower. Moreover, 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that diversification tends to increase bank leverage and risk. 
Deng and Elyasiani (2008) explicitly test for the role of geographic diversification in US banks 
and find that geographic diversification boosts valuations while increased distance between 
bank headquarters and branches reduces valuations.  However, they do not identify exogenous 
sources of variation in geographic diversification.  
Another line of research estimates the cost functions of banks with different industrial 
organizations (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Berger, Hanweck, Humphrey, 1987; Ferrier et al, 
1993). Drucker and Puri (2005) find that conglomerates that combine lending and 
underwriting activities tend to charge lower fees. Rather than attempting to measure costs, 
margins, idiosyncratic risk, and agency frictions directly, we assess the net effect of BHC 
diversity on q. More generally, the purpose of this paper is to identify and estimate the net   6 
effect of diversification on firm valuation and not to examine the precise nature of the 
underlying channels of this effect. 
Examining the geographic diversity of U.S. BHCs in the 1980s and 1990s informs current 
debates on the value of international and cross-border banking. By examining the geographic 
diversification of BHCs across U.S. states, we consider a very simple form of diversity that can 
easily be measured. Our prior expectations were that geographic diversity within a single 
country and industry should have positive effects on valuations through economies of scale and 
risk diversification, with only minor agency effects. If, on the other hand, the adverse valuation 
effects of diversifying across states dominate these positive effects, then this suggests that 
consequential agency problems shape the behavior of financial conglomerates. Our results are 
consistent with the latter. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data and interstate bank 
deregulation. Section 3 provides the ordinary least squares results, while Sections 4 and 5 
discuss the instrumental variable findings.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and interstate bank deregulation 
2.1. Sources 
We use balance sheet information on BHCs and their chartered subsidiary banks.  For 
BHCs, data are collected on a quarterly basis by the Federal Reserve and published in the 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies. Since June 1986, domestic BHCs report their 
consolidated balance sheet, income statement, and detailed supporting schedules to the Federal   7 
Reserve.1 Furthermore, all banking institutions regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Federal Reserve, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency file Reports 
of Condition and Income, known as Call Reports, which include balance sheet and income data 
on a quarterly basis. Call Reports also report the identity of the entity that holds at least 50% of 
a banking institution’s equity stake (RSSD9364), which we use to link banking subsidiaries to 
their parent BHCs. We obtain qualitatively similar results when performing the analysis using 
Federal Reserve data on bank branches rather than subsidiaries, and constructing a measure of 
diversification based on branches. The drawback of using information on branches is that such 
information is available only on an annual basis and limited to commercial banks, while data on 
subsidiaries is available at a quarterly level and for a broader set of financial institutions that 
includes commercial banks, state-chartered savings banks, and cooperative banks.2
Information on Market Capitalization of publicly traded BHCs is obtained from the 
Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP), where we use the end of quarter market 
capitalization for all registered BHCs in the United States. The Bureau of Economic Analysis 
provides state level data on social and economic demographics.  
  
For interstate deregulation, Amel (1993) and our own updates provide information on 
changes in state laws that affect the ability of commercial banks to expand across state borders.  
Commercial banks in the U.S. were prohibited from entering other states due to regulations. 
Over the period from 1978 through 1994, states removed these restrictions by either (1) 
unilaterally opening their state borders and allowing out-of-state banks to enter or (2) signing 
                                                        
1 The corresponding reporting form is called FR Y-9X. More information is available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/ReportDetail.cfm?WhichFormId=FRY-9C. 
2 We exclude subsidiaries that exclusively engage in foreign activities since they do not contribute to domestic 
diversification, which is the focus of our study.   8 
reciprocal bilateral and multilateral branching agreements with other states and thereby 
allowing out-of-state banks to enter. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 repealed the prohibition on 
BHCs headquartered in one state from acquiring banks in other states. Amel (1993) reports for 
each state and year, the states in which a state’s BHC can open subsidiary banks. We confirmed 
the dating of the state-by-state relaxation of interstate banking restrictions in Amel (1993) and 
extended the data through 2007 using information from each state’s bank regulatory authority. 
 
2.2. Geographic diversification 
For each BHC, in each quarter, we determine the cross-state distribution of its bank 
subsidiaries, typically weighting the subsidiaries by their assets. We use the location of the 
BHC’s subsidiaries as reported in the Call Reports. We define BHC diversity in terms of the 
location of its bank network, not the physical location of those receiving loans. This is 
appropriate for gauging the effect of geographic diversity on agency problems within BHCs.  
We use four variables to capture the extent of a BHC’s geographic diversification. First, 
we use a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a bank holding company has 
subsidiaries in more than one state, and zero otherwise. Additionally, we compute the share of 
a holding company’s assets that are held in out-of-state affiliates, i.e., subsidiaries not located in 
the same state as the bank holding company. Our third measure of geographic diversification is 
a bank holding company’s concentration of assets across states. We measure this by calculating 
the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index of a BHC’s assets in each state in which it is active. To 
construct a measure that is increasing in the degree of geographic diversification, we subtract 
the value of this Herfindahl Index from one, and use this as our third measure of geographic 
diversification. Our final measure of geographic diversification is the average distance (in   9 
miles) between the BHC’s headquarters and its affiliated subsidiaries. We compute this distance 
measure using information on the location of counties in which the holding company and its 
subsidiaries are located. 
 
2.3. Activity diversity 
In our analyses, we account for differences in the diversity of BHCs’ financial activities in 
order to focus on the independent impact of geographic diversity on BHC behavior. Laeven and 
Levine (2007) show that financial institutions that combine lending activities and non-lending 
activities (such as underwriting) have lower market values. We use their empirical proxies of 
activity diversity to control for diversification across different financial activities. We use both 
their index of income diversity (Income Diversity) and their index of diversity based on the 
allocation of BHC assets across lending and non-lending activities (Asset Diversity). The indexes 
take on values between zero and one, where larger values imply that the BHC’s income and 
assets are more diversified across lending and non-lending activities.3
                                                        




Net interest income is Total interest income minus Total interest expenses. Other operating income includes net 
fee income, net commission income, and net trading income. In turn, Asset Diversity is computed as: 
. 
Net loans is Total loans net of loan loss provisions, and Other earning assets include all earning assets other than 
loans (such as Treasuries and other fixed income securities, including mortgage-backed securities). 
   10 
 
2.4. Other factors   
To account for other influences, we control for several bank-specific as well as state-
specific characteristics. To capture differences in the size of BHCs, we include the natural log of 
total assets, the natural log of operating income, as well as the growth rate of these two 
variables. In further robustness tests, we also include the ratio of bank capital to total assets 
and its return on equity. To control for time-varying, state-specific characteristics, we include 
the median level of q, the concentration of banking assets, and the real growth rate of state 
personal income in our regression models. 
 
2.5. Sample construction 
Our sample of BHCs is constructed as follows. We first match subsidiaries of BHCs to 
their ultimate parent company using information from the Call Reports. Specifically, each 
subsidiary reports its unique parent company, and there can be several layers of subsidiaries 
and parent companies before the ultimate parent company is reached. We assign a subsidiary 
to the parent BHC that owns at least 50% of the subsidiary’s equity. We only focus on BHCs 
located in the U.S. and therefore drop holding companies chartered in Puerto Rico.  
Furthermore, we eliminate BHCs that change the location of their headquarters across states 
during the sample period. This is an exceeding small number of institutions, and the results 
hold when including them. 
Next, we merge this data with information on stock prices of traded BHCs from CRSP to   11 
compute Tobin’s q.4
We further exclude observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentile of q to 
mitigate the influence of outliers.  Our final sample contains 28,337 BHC-quarter observations 
of 756 BHCs. The time period of our sample ranges from the second quarter of 1986 to the last 
quarter of 2007 and includes all publicly traded BHCs, headquartered in one of the 50 states of 
the U.S. and the District of Columbia.  
 Three BHCs report two different stock prices for different classes of shares 
for about 13 quarters and therefore report two values of market capitalization. We sum the 
reported amounts of capitalization for each share class whenever two different classes of 
shares are traded in a quarter. Using data on stock market capitalization of a bank’s equity, we 
compute each bank’s Tobin’s q as the ratio of stock market capitalization of equity plus book 
value of total liabilities, minority interest, and perpetual preferred stock divided by the book 
value of total assets. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables, with the sample of 756 BHCs 
split into diversified and nondiversified BHC-quarter observations. Since BHCs diversify during 
our sample period, the same entity can appear in both columns of Table 1, being categorized as 
a nondiversified BHC in the quarters before it diversifies and a diversified BHC afterwards. 
About one quarter of our sample consists of BHCs with subsidiaries in more than one state. 
Also, more than half of all geographically diversified BHCs have at least five subsidiaries located 
in at least three different states. The majority of nondiversified BHCs, on the other hand, 
operate only one subsidiary.  
As shown, diversified banks tend to (1) have higher Tobin’s q, (2) be more profitable as 
                                                        
4 A data set matching Call Report and CRSP identifiers is available on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, see http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html.   12 
measured by the return on equity, (3) be much larger, and (4) be more diverse in their 
activities, as measured by Income Diversity and Asset Diversity. Thus, it is important to 
consider BHC traits in assessing the relationship between diversity and q. 
Table 2 presents ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression results focusing on differences 
between diversified and nondiversified BHCs. The regressions condition on state- and quarter 
fixed effects. The results suggest that geographic diversification is associated with greater 
activity diversity. Moreover, compared to nondiversified BHCs, geographically diversified BHCs 
are more profitable and larger.  
 
3. Geographic diversity of BHC assets and Tobin’s q: OLS results 
3.1. Preliminary results 
As a preliminary assessment of the relationship between the market valuation of a BHC 
and its geographic diversification, we first estimate OLS regressions. The reduced form model is 
specified as follows: 
        (1) 
where qist denotes the Tobin’s q of BHC i in state s during quarter t,  Dist denotes alternative 
measures of a BHC’s geographic diversification,  X’ist is a matrix of conditioning information, and 
δ’s are fixed effects, where we use BHC, state, quarter, and state-quarter fixed effects in various 
specifications. Throughout the paper, the reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity 
robust and adjusted for clustering. The BHC fixed effects account for unobserved, time-
invariant differences across BHCs and focuses the analysis on how the valuation of a BHC 
changes after diversification changes. State-quarter fixed effects account for time-varying, 
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economic policies at the state level.  In alternative specifications, we also consider different 
combinations of fixed effects, including time-varying state fixed effects for the states in which a 
BHC has subsidiaries. 
In Table 3, we consider four measures of the cross-state diversity of BHC assets: (1) a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the BHC has bank subsidiaries in more than one 
state, and zero otherwise, (2) the fraction of the BHC’s total assets held in out of state 
subsidiaries, (3) one minus the Herfindahl index of the distribution of the BHC’s assets across 
states, and (4) the average distance (in miles) between the BHC’s central office and its 
subsidiaries (including subsidiaries within the home state). In the first four regressions, we 
simply condition on state and quarter fixed effects. In the next four regressions, we also control 
for BHC fixed effects.  
The relationship between geographic diversity and q depends on whether the regression 
excludes or includes BHC fixed effects. Without BHC fixed effects, there is a positive association 
between each of the four diversity measures and q, which confirms the results in Deng and 
Elyasiani (2008). But, with BHC fixed effects, there is a strong negative relationship between 
diversity and q, although only three of the four measures of diversification—the fraction of 
assets held by out-of-state banks being the exception—enter significantly.5 The association 
between diversification and q also holds when using state-quarter fixed effects. These results 
are consistent with the view that more highly valued BHCs diversify but valuations fall after 
BHCs diversify geographically.6
                                                        
5 All four measures of diversification enter negative and significantly if we limit the sample to bank holding 
companies without international activities. 
  
6 Deng and Elyasiani (2008) distinguish between diversification and distance. As a robustness test, we control for 
distance and obtain the same results on diversification.   14 
Without addressing causality, the economic magnitudes are small. For example, the 
estimated coefficient in column 7 indicates that if the median nondiversified BHC switched to 
the median level of diversity, this would be associated with a drop in q of about 0.4, i.e., about 
0.4% since median q is about 100. This drop translates into a drop in market capitalization of 
the average bank of about $15 million. Aggregating across all banks in our sample, the 
coefficient estimates suggest a drop of bank capitalization in the neighborhood of $20 billion 
associated with geographic diversification. While small, the coefficients from Table 3 reflect a 
net result that also incorporates the positive ramifications of diversification.  
Of course, reverse causality is likely to attenuate the OLS coefficient if high valuations 
encourage geographic diversification. Thus, using instruments that isolate the causal impact of 
diversification on valuations might yield larger effects, which is indeed what we find below. 
One concern about the results in Table 3 is that there might be trends in BHC valuations 
that start before the BHC diversifies. Specifically, we want to know whether there is a break in 
the evolution of q once a BHC diversifies. If values were falling before a BHC diversifies, then 
the regressions in Table 3 would still indicate that q fell after diversification. However, it would 
not imply that diversification was the cause of this fall as there was no break in the evolution of 
q following diversification.  
Thus, we trace out the dynamics between diversification and BHC valuations to assess 
whether there are pre-diversification trends in q using the following regression:  
,      (2) 
where D-j equals one for BHCs in the jth quarter before the BHC first diversifies into another 
state, D+j equals one for BHCs in the jth quarter after the BHC first diversifies, and β-j and β+j are 
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for BHC and state-quarter fixed effects. We consider a window of 20 quarters, spanning from 10 
quarters before the BHC first diversifies until 10 quarters afterwards.  We estimate this 
relationship only for BHCs that expanded geographically during the sample period. Figure 1 
plots the estimated coefficients from the regression: the solid line is the estimated coefficients 
(β-10, β-9, etc.), while the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval.  
As shown in Figure 1, there is a marked break in BHC q after it first diversifies across 
state boundaries and the drop in q grows for a few quarters afterwards as well. There are no 
signs of a change in q, or trends in q, prior to deregulation. 
 
3.2 Robustness tests with additional controls 
In Table 4, we assess the robustness of the relationship between the cross-state 
diversity of BHC assets and a BHC’s q by controlling for many additional BHC-specific and state-
specific factors, and by considering alternative combinations of fixed effects, including dummy 
variables to control for the states where a BHC has subsidiaries. The regressions in Table 4 use 
our broadest measure of geographic diversity, i.e., 1 – the Herfindahl index of BHC assets across 
states. 
The literature has raised several concerns about drawing inferences about a 
diversification discount without accounting for the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
For example, using plant-level data from U.S. manufacturing firms, Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002) find that less productive firms tend to diversify, but diversity does not cause lower 
productivity. Campa and Kedia (2002) find that the same characteristics that induce 
manufacturing firms to diversify also lower firm values. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) 
argue that nonfinancial conglomerates tend to purchase already discounted target firms, which   16 
produces the diversification discount. Custodio (2010) notes that M&As typically trigger an 
upward revaluation of the book value of assets, which will mechanically reduce q, potentially 
leading to spurious inferences about the relationship between diversity and valuations. Thus, a 
proper examination of the impact of diversification must account for the potential complexities 
introduced by M&As. 
The particulars of BHC diversification permit us to assess the empirical importance of 
these concerns. In our sample, changes in BHC diversity occur for three reasons: (1) M&As of 
subsidiaries in other states, (2) de novo expansion, where a BHC establishes new subsidiaries, 
and (3) organic diversification, where there are changes in the relative size of a BHC’s 
subsidiaries. In the nonfinancial diversification literature, concerns have primarily been raised 
about M&As, not the other methods of diversification. We consider both acquisitions and sales 
of subsidiaries. While acquisitions tend to increase BHC complexity, sales of subsidiaries tend 
to simplify the subsidiary structure of BHCs. According to the view that the complexity of BHCs 
is positively associated with agency problems within the BHC, simplifying transactions should 
increase q, while complicating transactions should reduce a BHC’s q. To control for the 
influence of acquisitions and sales of bank subsidiaries on BHC q, we include a variable that 
equals the share of BHC assets acquired or sold in quarter t. 
We find that the negative association between BHC diversity and q is quite robust.  First, 
the results hold when controlling for BHC-specific factors, including the median q of all BHCs in 
the state, the degree of market concentration in the BHC’s home state, the growth of total assets 
and operating income, the return on equity, the capital-to-asset ratio, BHC asset size and 
operating income, the degree to which the BHC receives income from diverse financial activities 
and invests its assets in diverse activities, a dummy variable that denotes whether the BHC has   17 
a subsidiary with international activity, and the share of assets acquired or sold during the 
quarter, and after we control for time-varying, state-specific factors, such as the growth of 
personal income. While the diversity of BHC activities, as measured by the degree to which the 
BHC receives income from non-interest earning assets and invests in assets beyond loans, is 
negatively associated with q, the regression still indicates an independent, negative association 
between cross-state asset diversity and BHC q. Moreover, the results do not seem to be driven 
by changes in the accounting value of assets or other oddities around the time of M&As. We 
continue to find that a larger degree of BHC diversity is associated with lower q after 
conditioning on BHC acquisitions and sales. 
Second, the results are robust to controlling for the location of a BHC’s subsidiaries. For 
example, two BHCs chartered in Rhode Island could each have a single subsidiary, one in 
Massachusetts and the other in Connecticut. Thus, in Table 4, we incorporate a set of state 
dummy variables for each BHC, where the value of each dummy equals one if the BHC has a 
subsidiary in that state and quarter, and zero if the BHC does not have a subsidiary in that state 
and quarter (column 4). Moreover, we allow the effect of diversifying into each particular state 
to vary over time (column 6). Again, we find a robust negative relation between the cross-state 
diversity of BHC assets and market valuations after controlling in this manner for the state-
specific location of a BHC’s subsidiaries.  
The OLS estimates presented thus far do not permit a causal interpretation. In 
particular, OLS estimates might be biased because BHC valuations could shape the decision of 
BHCs to expand geographically and because some third factor, such as time-varying differences 
in BHC management, could drive both diversification and q. To address this concern we employ 
an instrumental variables approach.   18 
 
4. Instrumental variables: state-time instruments 
To obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of BHC diversity on q, we need an 
instrumental variable that is correlated with the cross-state diversity of BHC assets but not 
independently correlated with q through other channels.  We employ two instrumental variable 
strategies. Our first strategy employs time-varying, state-level instruments. The next section 
develops an instrumental variable strategy to identify diversity at the BHC-level.  
4.1. The time-varying, state-level instruments 
We use the state-specific process of interstate bank deregulation to identify exogenous 
increases in the cross-state diversity of BHC assets.  The idea is that as one state, say 
Massachusetts, signed bilateral and multilateral reciprocal interstate banking agreements with 
other states over the years, and as other states made unilateral decisions allowing the entry of 
BHC subsidiaries from Massachusetts, BHCs from Massachusetts had greater opportunities to 
open subsidiaries in other states. As emphasized, there are enormous cross-state differences in 
the evolution of interstate bank deregulation. For each state, this was a dynamic process, not a 
single event. 
We consider nine sets of time-varying, state-level instruments. The first three do not 
explicitly account for the evolution of deregulation.  First, we simply use the number of years 
since a state first started liberalizing its interstate banking restrictions (Years since interstate 
bank deregulation), thereby allowing BHCs from other states to enter. Second, we use this 
variable, Years since interstate bank deregulation, and its square to allow for a quadratic 
relationship between interstate deregulation and the cross-state diversification of BHC assets. 
Third, we consider a nonparametric specification that includes independent dummy variables   19 
for each year since the state started liberalizing interstate banking restrictions, taking a value of 
one all the way through the first ten years after deregulation, and zero otherwise. 
The remaining six instrument sets explicitly account for state differences in the 
evolution of deregulation. The fourth instrument set equals the logarithm of the number of 
states in which a BHC can open subsidiaries, including its home state. This is a simple measure 
of the number of states in which a BHC can potentially operate, and we refer to this variable as 
Ln (Number of accessible states). Fifth, we weight the number of accessible states by the 
inverse of their distance from the home state, since it might be less costly for a bank in 
California to open a subsidiary in, say, Nevada than in, say, New Hampshire (Number of 
accessible states – weighted).7
For the sixth and seventh instrument sets, we use a measure of the potential interstate 
market available to BHCs by including the natural logarithm of the total population of the states 
in which the BHC could potentially operate, excluding the BHC’s home state. We refer to this 
variable as Ln (Market Population). Thus, rather than simply counting the number of accessible 
states, as done in Ln (Number of accessible states), Ln (Market Population) also captures 
information on the potential market available to the BHC from the opening of subsidiaries 
elsewhere. For the seventh instrument, we weight the sixth measure of the potential population 
available to BHCs by the relative distance of the market from the BHCs home state, and refer to 
  
                                                        








=   − 
, where dij 
is the distance between home state i and state j, and df (dc) is the distance between the home state and the farthest 
(closest) state.  
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this variable as Ln(Market Population – Weighted), where we use the aforementioned 
weighting scheme.  
Finally, the eighth and ninth instruments are based on Market Potential, which equals 
Market Population divided by the population of BHC’s home state. This variable captures the 
possibility that the desirability of opening a subsidiary in another state is positively associated 
with the additional market made available by that state. Thus, a BHC in California and a BHC in 
Nevada might view the appeal of opening a subsidiary in, say, Oregon differently. The ninth 
instrument uses the weighted version of this instrument.  
 
4.2. First-stage regression results and instrument validity 
The first-stage regressions are presented in Panel B of Table 5. As shown in columns one 
through nine, we find that interstate deregulation increased the degree of cross-state diversity 
of BHC assets. The positive impact of deregulation on BHC diversity holds across the different 
indicators of interstate bank deregulation. When considering the time-varying evolution of 
interstate restrictions (column (4) to (9)), we find the link between diversification and 
deregulation to be statistically weakest when focusing only on the number of states in which a 
BHC can potentially open a subsidiary. The explanatory power of our measure of deregulation 
in explaining BHC diversification increases when we also incorporate the size and distance of 
potential markets into our instrument. This suggests that the distance and population of 
potential markets shape BHC (“foreign-state”) direct investment decisions. 
The significant impact of deregulation on BHC diversity holds when conditioning on a 
full set of BHC-specific, and state-specific factors as well as state and quarter fixed effects. Since 
the treatment is occurring at the state-time level, we do not employ BHC fixed effects in these   21 
first set of instrumental variable results. However, we do include BHC fixed effects later when 
we develop a BHC-level treatment. 
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of the instrumental variables. First, the F-
test results show that interstate deregulation explains BHC diversity after controlling for many 
potential influences. For seven out of the nine sets of instrumental variables, the F-test is above 
ten and sometimes exceeds 30. For these sets of instrumental variables, there is a strong 
statistical link between deregulation and BHC diversity. Second, for these seven sets of 
instruments, the Hansen J-test results (not reported) indicate that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. Thus, there is no evidence that these seven 
instruments explain BHC valuations beyond their ability to account for variation in the cross-
state diversity of BHC assts. Third, as depicted in Figure 1, there is no indication of any trends in 
q prior to deregulation and hence no suggestion that changes in q prior to deregulation predict 
the timing of deregulation or the evolution of q following deregulation. Fourth, we could find no 
evidence—either in the historical evidence on how states formed bilateral and multilateral 
interstate banking agreements or in the data—that states selected other states based on BHC 
valuations. As suggested by Amel (1993), the state-specific process of forming a series of 
interstate banking agreements with other states evolved in a relatively chaotic manner, in 
which there is no evidence that states signed reciprocal interstate banking treaties based on q. 
Indeed, Figure 2 shows that there is essentially no relationship between the valuations of BHCs 
that sign interstate agreements.  
   22 
4.3. Second-stage regression results with time-varying, state-level instruments 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions of BHC q on 
BHC diversity for the nine different sets of instrumental variables. As already mentioned, the 
associated first-stage results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. 
The second-stage results indicate that the cross-state diversity of BHC assets lowers q. In 
particular, the projected value of BHC asset diversification is associated with a significant 
reduction in BHC q. The only exception is when using the instrumental variable Ln (Number of 
accessible states). As noted, this is also the only instrumental variable that has weak 
explanatory power in explaining the cross-state diversity of BHC assets in the first-stage. 
However, when we weight by the size of the accessible states or the distance of the accessible 
states from the BHC, this (1) improves the fit of the first-stage regression and (2) yields a 
second-stage result in which the exogenous component of BHC diversity is negatively, and 
statistically significantly, linked to BHC q.  
The economic size of the estimated impact of cross-state asset diversity on market 
valuation of a BHC is large.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in the asset 
diversity index (1 – Herfindahl Index of assets across states) implies a decrease in q of about 30 
percent of its standard deviation when using regressions (4) or (5), a reduction of over 40 
percent of its standard deviation when using regressions (6) or (7), and a reduction of about 12 
percent of its standard deviation when using the other regressions. As another example, 
consider New Jersey and the regression estimates in regression (7) of Table 5. The results 
suggest that if New Jersey were to change from a situation in which its banks were prohibited 
from diversifying into any state to a situation in which all states allowed New Jersey banks to 
enter that the average q of banks in New Jersey would fall by almost 5 percent. This is   23 
substantial.  Aggregating across the U.S. banking system, it would involve a drop in market 
capitalization of about $225 billion.   
The 2SLS estimates are between 10 and 20 times larger than the OLS estimates in 
absolute value terms. One explanation for this result is that higher-valued BHCs are more likely 
to diversify than lower-valued BHCs, biasing the OLS estimate toward zero. The 2SLS estimates 
identify the true, larger, impact of BHC diversity on q. 
 
5. Instrumental variables: gravity-deregulation model  
One shortcoming with the analyses thus far is that we have examined the impact of 
diversity on valuations for the average BHC in a state: We have not yet developed and 
employed a BHC-level instrumental variable. We would like, however, to distinguish among 
BHCs within the same state and identify the impact of an exogenous increase in diversity on 
BHC valuations for individual financial institutions. 
In this section, we design a strategy to identify the impact of diversity on q at the BHC-
level—or, more precisely, at the county-level. We do this by simultaneously (a) using the 
dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation discussed above to differentiate across states 
and time and (b) using the distance of each BHC’s county to other states (as well as other 
county demographic traits) to differentiate across BHCs within the same state.  
 
5.1. Gravity-deregulation model: strategy 
We use a gravity model to construct a time-varying, BHC-county-specific instrumental 
variable for diversification, which we then use in our two-stage least squares evaluation of the 
impact of diversity on q. Frankel and Romer (1999) developed this approach to study whether   24 
international trade causes economic growth. They first use a gravity model of international 
trade to estimate bilateral trade volumes between countries. Based on the projected bilateral 
trade volumes, they construct the projected aggregate trade volume of each country. Using this 
projected trade share as their instrument for actual trade in their first stage regression, they 
assess the causal impact of trade on growth. 
Based on the gravity model, we hypothesize that BHCs will invest more in 
geographically close states than in far states. BHCs that are close to another state might have 
greater familiarity with its economic conditions and face lower costs to establishing and 
maintaining subsidiaries than farther states. From this perspective, a BHC in the southern part 
of California will tend to invest more in Arizona than Oregon and a BHC in the northern part 
California might find it correspondingly more appealing to open a subsidiary in Oregon. To 
measure closeness to other states, we compute the distance (in 100s of miles) of the county of 
each BHC’s headquarters to each other state’s capital, which we call “Distance in 100 miles.” 
Since we are focusing on interstate banking diversification, we assume that the distance to the 
capital of a BHC’s home state is equal to zero.  
We further hypothesize that BHCs will be more attracted to comparatively larger 
markets than smaller markets. Thus, holding other things constant, BHCs in Colorado will 
invest more in California than in Wyoming. To measure relative market size, we compute the 
logarithm of the population of the BHC’s home state (in period t) divided by the population of a 
foreign state (in period t): Ln(Population-ratio). 
We also allow for the possibility that the comparative size of the BHC’s home county 
affects its “foreign-state” direct investment decisions. BHCs based in a relatively urban, active 
county might require a larger foreign market before investing abroad than BHCs in smaller   25 
counties. At the same time, distance might matter less for a BHC from an urban, active county 
than BHCs from smaller, less active environments. Adding these additional county-specific 
traits also helps in differentiating between BHCs in the same state. 
 
5.2. The gravity-deregulation model: two-step process 
In the first step (“zero stage”) of the gravity-deregulation model, we estimate the 
following model: 
Shareb,i,j,t = a*Distanceb,i,j+ b*Ln(popi,t/popj,t) + c*Xb,i,j,t + δb + δi + δj + δi,j + δt + δi,t + εb,i,j,t ,   (3) 
 
where Shareb,i,j,t is the percentage of assets of BHC b, headquartered in state i, held in its 
subsidiaries in state j in quarter t; Distanceb,i,j is the distance in 100s of miles between the 
county of BHC b’s headquarters and state j’s capital; and Ln(popi,t/popj,t)  is the Ln(Population-
ratio) defined above. In some specifications, we also control for a matrix of variables Xb,i,j,t, 
including (a) the interaction of Ln(popi,t/popj,t) and a dummy variable that equals one if the 
BHC is headquartered in a comparatively big county (e.g., in the top-third of counties in the 
home state by population) in quarter t, (b) the interaction of Distanceb,i,j and a dummy variable 
that equals one if the BHC is headquartered in a comparatively big county, and (c) a dummy 
variable taking on the value of one if BHC b is located in a comparatively big county, as defined 
above. 
Furthermore, we condition on many possible fixed effects. In the specifications, we 
control for various combinations of BHC fixed effects (δb), separate fixed effects for each state 
(δi + δj), state-pair fixed effects (δi,j), quarter fixed effects (δt), and state-quarter fixed effects   26 
(δs,t). In this first step, we only include observations in which it is legally feasible for BHC b with 
headquarters in state i to open a subsidiary in state j during quarter t.8
As reported in Table 6, the gravity model can explain BHC investment in “foreign-states.” 
First and foremost, across the various specifications, there is a negative relationship between a 
BHC’s investment in a foreign state and the distance between the BHC’s county and the foreign 
state. Distance, however, matters less when the BHC is headquartered in a comparatively urban 
county, as demonstrated in regressions (2) – (5). Thus, there are good reasons for believing 
that interstate bank deregulation between state i and state j will differentially affect BHCs in 
state i, depending on their distance to state j and the nature of the county in which the BHC in 
state i is headquartered. Second, the size of the foreign market matters for the foreign state 
investment decisions of a BHC. As shown, BHCs are less likely to diversify into comparatively 
small states and this is particularly pronounced effect for BHCs from more urban counties. 
  
In the second step of the gravity-deregulation model, we construct a projected aggregate 
diversity measure for each BHC in each quarter, where the aggregation is done across all 
possible states into which the BHC can legally diversify. For observations in which a BHC is 
legally permitted to open a subsidiary in a particular state, we use the projection share from the 
estimated gravity models given in Table 6. For observations in which regulations prohibit a 
BHC from opening a subsidiary in a state, we set the projected share equal to zero. Then, we use 
these projected shares to compute the diversity index—the projected Herfindahl index of each 
BHC assets across states. We use this predicted diversity index from the gravity-deregulation 
model as the instrument for actual diversity in our first stage regression to assess the impact of 
                                                        
8 In this first step of the gravity-deregulation model, we tried several variations. Since many BHCs do not diversify, 
the dependent variable has many zeros. Thus, we estimate a Tobit rather than a linear OLS model. This yields 
stronger results than those reported below.   27 
diversity on q. We use the various specifications from the “zero stage” equations from Table 6 
to construct the first-stage instruments. 
 
5.3. Results using BHC instruments based on the gravity-deregulation model 
The first-stage results in Table 7 suggest that the instrumental variable is very useful in 
explaining BHC diversity as the F-test of the excluded instruments is above ten. In this table, we 
use regression (5) of Table 6, but the results hold for the other gravity models provided in 
Table 6. 
As shown in Table 7, the second-stage results indicate that geographic diversity reduces 
Tobin’s q. By using time-varying, BHC-county-specific instrumental variables, this gravity-
deregulation strategy differentiates among BHCs within the same state and quarter. It identifies 
the impact of BHC’s diversity on q, so we can condition on BHC and state-time fixed effects 
throughout. Indeed, following Frankel and Romer (1999), all of the fixed-effects included in the 
zero stage are also included in the first and second stages.9
In columns (2) and (3), we show that the influence of diversification on Tobin’s q 
operates primarily through changes in market capitalization rather than changes in other 
components of Tobin’s q. This provides additional evidence that the findings on q do not simply 
reflect accounting quirks around cross-state mergers and acquisitions that alter a bank’s book 
value. Rather, the change in q reflects a change in the market’s valuation of the BHC.   
 
                                                        
9 Furthermore, Rubinstein (2011) has critiqued the Frankel and Romer (1999) approach because the fixed effects 
from the zero stage enter in a nonlinear manner when aggregating to produce the instrument for the first-stage. 
Thus, we also conducted the analyses in two ways to address this concern. First, we excluded all fixed effects from 
the zero-stage. Second, we did the estimation in the zero-stage with the fixed effects, but did the projections to 
form the instrumental variables while setting the coefficients on the fixed effects in the zero-stage to zero. All of 
the results hold. Indeed the magnitude of the coefficient in the valuation regression increases markedly.   28 
Columns (4)-(6) provide additional evidence on the robustness of the Table 7 findings. 
Since some of the banks in our sample engage in international activities, we wanted to assess 
whether the banks drive the results. As shown, the results are robust to excluding BHCs with 
subsidiaries that engage in international activities. Moreover, we were concerned that there 
might be accounting oddities around the time of BHC M&As. Although the results in columns 
(2) and (3) suggest that accounting factors are not driving the results, we tried eliminating the 
period immediately around M&As. The results are even stronger when excluding observations 
during quarters when BHCs acquire or sell subsidiaries. 
 
5.4. Advantages of the gravity-deregulation model and the economic effects 
The BHC-county-level instrumental variable results in Table 7 have two particularly 
valuable properties relative to the results based on state-level instruments (Table 5). First, the 
BHC-county-level instruments differentiate among BHCs within the same state and quarter. 
Although we control for state-quarter characteristics in the earlier analyses (including the time-
varying level of competition within each state), the state-time level instrumental variable 
results only provide information on the “average” BHC in a state. But, the BHC-county-level 
instrumental variable specification provides information on the average BHC within each 
state’s county. This allows us to draw sharper inferences about the impact of BHC diversity on 
valuations.  
Second, the BHC-county-level instrumental variable results suggest that diversification 
per se—not an intensification of bank competition triggered by interstate deregulation—is 
driving the results. In particular, we were concerned that if state A signs an interstate banking 
agreement with state B, then valuations of state A’s BHCs might fall because of greater   29 
competition coming from state B’s banks, not because of an intensification of agency problems 
caused by some of state A’s BHCs diversifying into state B. However, the county-level analyses 
reduce these concerns for two reasons. First, they account for statewide, unobservable time-
varying changes, such as changes in competition within a state, by introducing state-quarter 
fixed effects into the analyses. Second, the gravity-deregulation model distinguishes among 
BHCs within the same state. This helps identify the impact of diversity on valuations by 
controlling for changes in statewide bank competition resulting from the signing of interstate 
banking agreements.  To see this, consider state A, which is closed to “foreign” banks. Banks 
within state A compete with one another. When state A deregulates with state B, competition 
within state A intensifies. The interstate banking agreement affects state A’s entire banking 
market since banks within state A compete with one another. Thus, by differentiating among 
counties within state A, we show that only BHCs in treated counties that diversified into other 
states experienced a drop in q; the drop in q cannot be due to a state-level effect because we are 
differentiating by county. Under the assumption that a state is the relevant banking market, 
these results suggest that geographic diversification lowered BHC valuations.  
Economically, the BHC-county-level instrumental variable results—based on the 
gravity-deregulation model—are substantially larger in magnitude than the results based on 
state-level instruments.   Regulatory induced changes in diversity that affect BHCs differently 
depending on their location have large economic effects on valuations, reducing Tobin’s q by 
between five and ten percent when a state goes from completely closed to completely open.  As 
the treatment becomes more refined, moving from a state-time treatment to a county-time 
instrument, we better identify the impact of an exogenous increase of diversification on BHCs’ 
valuations—and, the estimated impact has a larger economic magnitude.   30 
The results are consistent with the following view. First, the process of interstate bank 
deregulation that started in 1978 increased the cross-state asset diversity of some BHCs. 
Second, this increased diversity boosted the complexity of BHCs and intensified agency 
problems, making it more difficult for small shareholders and creditors to monitor corporate 
insiders and easier for insiders to extract larger private benefits from controlling these 
financial institutions.  Lower market valuations reflect such increase in agency problems due to 
BHC diversity triggered by interstate bank deregulation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines how an exogenous increase in the geographic diversity of a BHC’s 
assets affects the market’s valuation of the BHC. We first use the state-specific, time-series 
pattern of interstate bank deregulation to identify the exogenous component of the geographic 
diversity of BHC assets and we then also incorporate a gravity model of BHC investments across 
states to differentiate among BHCs within the same state. This allows us to draw more precise 
inferences about the causal impact of geographic diversity on the valuation of firms than 
previous research.  
We find that increases in geographic diversity due to interstate bank deregulation 
reduced BHC valuations. These results can be interpreted more broadly than simply providing 
information about the increased complexity of monitoring geographically diffuse BHCs. The 
results are consistent with the view that an exogenous increase in complexity—by making it 
more difficult for outside investors to exert effective corporate control—allows corporate 
insiders to extract larger private rents with adverse implications on firm value.    31 
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Figure 1. The Dynamic Impact of Geographic Expansion on q.  This figure plots the 
impact of a geographic expansion on BHC’s q. We consider a window of 20 quarters, 
spanning from 10 quarters before diversification until 10 quarters after geographic 
expansion. We report estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
 
qit = α + β−10D−10t + β−9D−9t +...+ β 10D 10t +εit, where D-j  equals one for banks in the jth quarter 
before expansion, D+j  equals one for banks in the jth quarter after expansion. Our 
coefficients are centered on the quarter of expansion. The solid line denotes the estimated 
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Figure 2. Differences in q before (bilateral) interstate banking agreement. This figure 
plots the average q in state 1 against the average q in state 2 before both states remove their 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
                           
 
Nondiversified bank holding companies 
 
Diversified bank holding companies 
  N  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  Median    N  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  Median 
                            Tobin's Q  21,837  105.76  5.70  94.95  130.59  104.85 
 
6,500  106.17  6.17  95.00  130.69  104.80 
Fraction of assets held by out-of-state-banks  21,833  0  0  0  0  0 
 
6,497  0.19  0.17  0.00  0.90  0.14 
1 - Herfindahl index of assets across states  21,833  0  0  0  0  0 
 
6,487  0.43  0.26  0.00  1.00  0.40 
Number of states  21,837  1  0  1  1  1 
 
6,500  3.20  1.86  2  14  3 
Number of subsidiaries  21,837  1.99  2.62  1  38  1 
 
6,500  8.41  9.62  2  72  5 
Income diversity  21,268  0.64  0.12  0.02  1  0.63 
 
6,443  0.74  0.12  0.06  1.00  0.73 
Asset diversity  21,706  0.77  0.17  0.00  1  0.80 
 
6,395  0.81  0.14  0.00  1.00  0.84 
=1 if BHC has subsidiary with international activity  21,837  0.03  0.16  0  1  0 
 
6,500  0.24  0.42  0  1  0 
Share of assets acquired or sold in quarter  21,834  6.14  21.80  0.00  96.68  0.00 
 
6,500  10.51  23.41  0.00  93.80  0.00 
Equity (in $millions)  21,837  227.23  837.51  1.72  2.07E+04  67.68 
 
6,500  3,187.83  1.16E+04  11.63  1.47E+05  575.57 
Total assets (in $ millions)  21,837  2,793.69  1.11E+04  77.28  2.99E+05  792.34 
 
6,500  4.21E+04  1.52E+05  150.62  2.36E+06  7,146.60 
Net interest income  (in $ millions)  21,277  23.03  65.50  -77.54  1,195.28  7.88 
 
6,444  308.66  979.57  -1.57  1.29E+04  64.97 
Total operating income  (in $ millions)  21,277  57.30  219.01  1.69  5,287.60  16.07 
 
6,444  927.79  3,112.60  -685.44  4.57E+04  155.00 
Return on equity  20,893  3.00  1.58  -9.61  6.81  3.18 
 
6,339  3.31  1.58  -9.55  6.81  3.54 
Average distance between HQ and subsidiaries  21,755  5.33  12.78  0  893.21  0.00 
 
6,500  91.38  125.52  1.13  807.80  47.13 
Capital-to-asset ratio  21,837  8.68  2.32  0.48  40.87  8.43 
 
6,500  8.03  1.81  3.01  17.76  7.95 
Growth of total assets  20,797  0.03  0.05  -0.08  0.40  0.02 
 
6,317  0.03  0.06  -0.08  0.40  0.02 
Growth of total operating income  20,250  0.03  0.08  -0.26  0.59  0.02 
 
6,208  0.03  0.08  -0.26  0.59  0.02 
                           
                            This table shows summary statistics for the used samples. Banks are 'nondiversified' if they have subsidiaries in only one state. 'Diversified' banks have subsidiaries in at least two states. The sample ranges from the second quarter of 
1986 to the last quarter of 2007. State-quarter observations for 756 BHCs.   37 
Table 2: Differences between Diversified and Undiversified Bank Holding Companies 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         








          Diversification dummy  0.090***  0.024***  0.329***  2.316*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.026)  (0.035) 
          State-quarter fixed effects         
         
          Observations  28,476  28,696  27,946  29,732 
This table reports regression results from a state-quarter fixed effects OLS analysis. The dependent variable is given in the second row. Diversification 
dummy is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a bank holding company has subsidiaries in other states, and zero otherwise. Income Diversity 
is given as 1 - |(Net Interest Income - Total Noninterest Income)/( Total Operating Income ) |, Asset diversity is defined as 1 - |( Net Loans - Other Earning 
Assets)/( Total Earning Assets ) |. 
State-specific time dummies for each quarter are used. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the state-quarter level 
and reported in parentheses below. Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   38 
Table 3: Geographic Diversification and Bank Holding Company Value 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                  Diversification dummy  1.158*** 
     
-0.205** 
     
 
(0.072) 
     
(0.096) 
      Fraction of assets held by out-of-state-banks 
 
3.189*** 
     
-0.305 
   
   
(0.269) 
     
(0.313) 
    1 - Herfindahl index of assets across states 
   
1.534*** 
     
-0.395** 
 
     
(0.129) 
     
(0.161) 
  Ln(Average distance between HQ and subsidiaries) 
     
0.284*** 
     
-0.056** 
       
(0.020) 
     
(0.026) 
                 
                  Quarter fixed effects                 
                 
State fixed effects                 
                 
Bank holding company fixed effects                 
                 
                  Observations  28,337  28,330  28,320  28,255  28,337  28,330  28,320  28,255 
This table reports regression results from a fixed effects OLS analysis. The dependent variable is Tobin's q and given as (Capitalization + Perpetual Preferred Stock + Total Liabilities and Minority Interest)/(Total 
Assets). For expositional purposes, Tobin's q is multiplied by 100. Diversification dummy is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a bank holding company has subsidiaries in another state, and zero 
otherwise. 'Fraction of assets held in out of state subsidiaries' is the fraction of assets that are in affiliated subsidiaries of a holding company that are not located in the same state as the bank holding company. '1-
Herfindahl index of assets across states' is 1 - the sum of squared share of assets held in different states. Ln(Average Distance between HQ and subsidiaries) is the log of the average distance in miles between a 
bank holding company headquarters’ county and the county of its affiliated subsidiary banks. Regressions in columns (1) through (4) include state and time dummies for each quarter (not reported). Regressions in 
columns (5) through (8) include bank holding company and quarter fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust, clustered at the state-quarter level and reported in parentheses. Significance stars are: * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   39 
Table 4: Geographic Diversification and Bank Holding Company Value:  Controls 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
              1 - Herfindahl Index of assets across states  -0.930***  -0.777***  -0.458***  -1.187***  -0.374**  -2.150*** 
 
(0.133)  (0.128)  (0.139)  (0.194)  (0.182)  (0.305) 
Median q in state and quarter  0.840***  0.618***  0.644***  0.655*** 
   
 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
    Market concentration (HHI)  -1.438***  -0.928***  -1.002***  -1.048*** 
   
 
(0.241)  (0.270)  (0.340)  (0.340) 
    Growth of total assets 
 
3.852***  2.943***  2.959***  2.745***  -0.672 
   
(0.596)  (0.476)  (0.473)  (0.558)  (0.602) 
Return on equity 
 
0.989***  0.434***  0.420***  0.469***  0.591*** 
   
(0.035)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.029) 
Capital-to-asset ratio 
 
0.267***  -0.027  -0.037**  -0.013  0.118*** 
   
(0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Growth of total operating income 
 
-4.950***  -3.904***  -4.034***  -4.364***  -1.091*** 
   
(0.440)  (0.328)  (0.329)  (0.397)  (0.422) 
Ln(Total operating income) 
 
6.836***  7.294***  7.486***  7.789***  0.934** 
   
(0.313)  (0.349)  (0.348)  (0.424)  (0.386) 
Income diversity 
 
-6.912***  -5.940***  -5.770***  -6.017***  -5.466*** 
   
(0.324)  (0.369)  (0.368)  (0.434)  (0.456) 
Asset diversity 
 
-1.121***  -0.369**  -0.329*  -0.188  -1.207*** 
   
(0.192)  (0.183)  (0.182)  (0.222)  (0.231) 
=1 if BHC has subsidiary with international activity 
 
-0.734***  -0.424***  0.029  -0.407**  -0.249 
   
(0.126)  (0.151)  (0.160)  (0.199)  (0.251) 
Share of assets acquired or sold in quarter 
 
0.003***  0.004***  0.004***  0.005***  0.004*** 
   
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ln(Total assets)  0.716***  -5.995***  -7.467***  -7.679***  -8.066***  0.263 
 
(0.029)  (0.312)  (0.360)  (0.358)  (0.437)  (0.361) 
Growth of state personal income  3.907  -1.853  2.565  2.379 
   
 
(2.684)  (2.830)  (2.658)  (2.626) 
    Growth of state personal income (lag)  6.931***  -2.663  3.848  3.837 
   
 
(2.679)  (3.025)  (2.840)  (2.818) 
   
              State fixed effects       
   
 
Subsidiary state fixed effects             
Quarter fixed effects         
 
 
Bank holding company fixed effects             
State-quarter fixed effects           
  Subsidiary state quarter fixed effects 
         
 
              Observations  28,320  25,505  25,505  25,505  25,505  25,505 
This table reports regression results from a fixed effects OLS analysis. The dependent variable is Tobin's q and given as (Capitalization + Perpetual Preferred Stock 
+ Total Liabilities and Minority Interest)/(Total Assets). For expositional purposes, Tobin's q is multiplied by 100. '1-Herfindahl index of assets across states' is 1 - 
the sum of squared share of assets held in different states by the parent bank holding company. 'Median q in state and quarter' is the median value of Tobin's q in a 
state in that quarter. 'Market Concentration (HHI)' is a Herfindahl Index of banking asset concentration in a holding company's market. 'Income Diversity' is given as 
1 - |(Net Interest Income - Total Noninterest Income)/( Total Operating Income )|, 'Asset Diversity' is defined as 1 - |( Net Loans - Other Earning Assets)/( Total 
Earning Assets ) |. 'Capital-Asset-Ratio' is the fraction of bank equity over total assets, 'Return on Equity' is defined as Net income / Equity. The used fixed effects 
model is indicated in the table: 'State fixed effects' account for the location of the holding company headquarter by including dummy variables, that take on the 
value of one if a holding company is headquartered in that state, and zero otherwise. The regression models labeled 'Subsidiary-state fixed effects' include a set of 
dummy variables that take on the value of one for each state a bank holding company has subsidiaries in. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the state-quarter 
level and reported in parentheses. Significance stars are: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Table 5: Geographic Diversification and Bank Holding Company Value: Instrumental Variables based on Interstate Branching Deregulation 
Panel A: Second Stage 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                    1 - Herfindahl Index of assets across states  -1.912  -1.822  -3.291***  -14.081*  -11.264***  -22.442**  -17.341***  -12.620***  -11.728*** 
 
(2.639)  (1.162)  (1.028)  (7.494)  (3.848)  (10.405)  (5.151)  (4.842)  (3.185) 
                    Bank and macro controls                   
State fixed effects                   
Quarter fixed effects                   
                    Observations  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431 
F Test of instruments' joint significance  32.08  67.30  15.94  6.864  23.38  6.335  19.88  16.58  36.74 
                             
Excluded instrument: 
                  Years since interstate branching deregulation                   
(Years since interstate branching deregulation)
2                   
Years since interstate branching deregulation [nonparametric]                   
Ln(Number of accessible states)                   
Ln(Number of accessible states - weighted)                   
Ln(Market population)                   
Ln(Market population - weighted)                   
Ln(Market potential)                   
Ln(Market potential - weighted)                   
This panel reports 2nd stage regression results from 2SLS analysis. The dependent variable is Tobin's q and given as (Capitalization + Perpetual Preferred Stock + Total Liabilities and Minority Interest)/(Total Assets). For expositional purposes, 
Tobin's q is multiplied by 100. The endogenous variable '1-Herfindahl index of assets across states' is 1 - the sum of squared share of assets held in different states by the parent bank holding company. The excluded instruments are given in the 
rows titled 'Instruments': 'Years since interstate branching deregulation' is the number of years since the liberalization of interstate branching restrictions. 'Number of accessible states' is the number of states a bank holding company can enter 
because of bilateral or unilateral branching agreements. It is zero if a bank holding company is not allowed to branch into any other state apart from the state where it is headquartered in. 'Market Population' is the total population, excluding the 
holding company's headquarter state's population, a bank holding company can access due to bilateral or unilateral branching agreements. 'Market Potential' is 'Market Population' divided by the population of a holding company's headquarter 
state. As indicated, these variables are weighted by the relative distance of each state to every other state whereas the closest state receives a weight of one and the farthest state receives a weight of zero. 
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Panel B: First Stage 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                    Years since interstate branching deregulation  0.008***  0.037*** 
             
 
(0.001)  (0.003) 




             
   
(0.000) 
              Ln(Number of accessible states) 
     
0.018*** 
         
       
(0.007) 
          Ln(Number of accessible states - weighted) 
       
0.035*** 
       
         
(0.007) 
        Ln(Market population) 
         
0.011** 
     
           
(0.004) 
      Ln(Market population - weighted) 
           
0.020*** 
   
             
(0.004) 
    Ln(Market potential) 
             
0.018*** 
 
               
(0.004) 
  Ln(Market potential - weighted) 
               
0.028*** 
                 
(0.005) 
=1 if one year after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.079*** 
           
 
   
(0.012) 
            =1 if two years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.115*** 
           
 
   
(0.013) 
            =1 if three years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.129*** 
           
 
   
(0.013) 
            =1 if four years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.134*** 
           
 
   
(0.013) 
            =1 if five years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.146*** 
           
 
   
(0.014) 
            =1 if six years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.143*** 
           
 
   
(0.014) 
            =1 if seven years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.154*** 
           
 
   
(0.015) 
            =1 if eight years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.161*** 
           
 
   
(0.016) 
            =1 if nine years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.160*** 
           
 
   
(0.016) 
            =1 if more than 10 years after interstate branching deregulation, 0 otherwise 
   
0.145*** 
           
 
   
(0.017) 
           
                    Bank and macro Controls                   
State fixed effects                   
Quarter fixed effects                   
                    F Test of joint significance  32.08  67.30  15.94  6.864  23.38  6.335  19.88  16.58  36.74 
Observations  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431  25,431   42 
 
 
Table 6: The Relationship between Population, Distance and BHC Asset Holdings: Zero-Stage 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
            Distance (in 100 miles)  -1.165***  -1.100***  -1.912***  -0.243***  -1.948*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Ln(population ratio)  -0.827***  -0.954***  -3.473***  -0.035  -5.829*** 
  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.129)  (0.042)  (0.248) 
(County population in state-quarter above 66th percentile) *  Ln(Population ratio) 
 
0.257***  0.208***  0.032***  0.369*** 
 
 
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.026) 
(County population in state-quarter above 66th percentile) * Distance (in 100 miles) 
 
-0.134***  -0.111***  0.035***  -0.097*** 
 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.014) 
County population in state-quarter above 66th percentile 
 
0.002***  0.002**  -0.002***  0.001 
 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
 
          State fixed effects   
 
 
    Quarter fixed effects   
 
   
  Bank holding company fixed effects           
State-pair fixed effects         




          Observations  1,123,007  1,122,940  1,122,940  1,122,940  1,122,940 
This table reports regression results from a state-quarter fixed effects OLS analysis. The dependent variable is the share of assets (in %) a BHC holds in a state. 'Population ratio' is the 
total population in a BHC's home state divided by the population in state A; 'Distance in 100 miles' is the distance between a BHC's home county and the capital of state A (in 100 miles). 
Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses. Significance stars are: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Geographic Diversification and Bank Holding Company Value: BHC-Specific Instrumental Variables Based on a Gravity-Deregulation Model 
   (1)     (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6) 
  
      Panel A: Components of q     Panel B: Sample: BHCs without subsidiaries that engage in 
international activities 
           
Exclude quarter if a bank holding company 
acquires/ sells a subsidiary 
Tobin's Q     Market 
Capitalization / 
Total Assets 
(Total Liabilities + 
Perpetual Preferred 
Stock)/ Total Assets 
      … in that quarter  … up to two quarters 
after acquisition/sale. 
                  1 - Herfindahl Index of assets across states  -33.740*** 
 
-31.718**  -0.322 
 




(12.478)  (0.845) 
 
(9.298)  (12.704)  (20.366) 
                  Bank and macro controls   
 
   
 
     
Bank holding company fixed effects   
 
   
 
     
State-quarter fixed effects   
 
   
 
     
                  Observations  24,524 
 
24,751  24,565 
 
22,762  19,597  18,022 
F-test of instruments' joint significance  12.84 
 
11.98  12.08 
 
14.35  12.47  8.182 
                  Fixed effects in gravity model: 
                  Bank holding company fixed effects   
 
   
 
     
State-quarter fixed effects   
 
   
 
     
                  This panel reports 2nd stage regression results from 2SLS analysis. The dependent variable is given in the column header. The endogenous variable '1-Herfindahl index of assets across states' is 1 - the sum of squared share of assets 
held in different states by the parent bank holding company. The excluded instrument is Herfindahl Index of assets across states (Predicted), which computed as follows:  
Using a gravity-deregulation model, we estimate how (a) the distance between a BHC's home county and the capital of state A and (b) the difference in population between a BHC's home state and state A, and (c) an indicator 
variable taking on the value of one if a BHC is located in a populous county are related to the share of assets a BHC holds in state A using a OLS regression. Using coefficient from this regression, we predict the share a BHC holds 
in a state and quarter, where we impose that BHC's projected holdings of assets are zero in states that they cannot enter because of interstate bank regulations. Finally, we aggregate the information for each BHC at the BHC-quarter 
level and compute the predicted Herfindahl Index of assets across state (Predicted). Standard errors are robust and reported in parentheses. Significance stars are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 